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Abstract: We respond to ‘challenge 3’ presented in Rose, Jones and Truex’s
excellent polemic by way of elucidating the meanings of hybrids, actants,
agency and symmetry in Actor-Network Theory. We provide a (very brief)
account of Latour’s project to unravel the modernist epistemological settle-
ment that separates humans and non-humans in the world, and that alas so
often results in errors and confusions. We contend that the framing of the
challenge itself implies the very distinctions that ANT seeks to reject (namely
the dichotomization of the world into mutually exclusive ‘subject’ and ‘object’
divisions). Following Latour, we argue that such pure forms do not exist—and
furthermore that ‘agency’ is the property of complex hybrids comprised of var-
ious strands of human and non-human materials and abstract elements. This
is the true meaning of the principle of symmetry! We conclude with some
counter-challenges of our own. 
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Why is the symmetry of human and non-human agency so troublesome? In a
trivial sense, of course machines have agency, as the following example from
the British Medical Journal excruciatingly illustrates (Citron and Wade 1980): 
We report four cases of penile injury sustained when using a vacuum cleaner,
probably in search of sexual excitement: Case 1—A 60-year-old man said that
he was changing the plug of his Hoover Dustette vacuum cleaner in the nude
while his wife was out shopping. It “turned itself on” and caught his penis,
causing tears around the external meatus and deeply lacerating the side of the
glans… Case 2—etc.
Not exactly a congruous response to the injunction ‘to take symmetry
seriously’ though nevertheless an entertaining and relevant (though gruesome)
vignette; a tad gratuitous, we concede, but of unimpeachable scholarly
provenance! But in advocating symmetry, Latour certainly had something
more subtle and profound in mind, and as two scholars under the influence (of
Actor-Network Theory!) let us now pick up the gauntlet of challenge 3, and
set out a more considered rejoinder to Rose, Jones and Truex’s stimulating
essay. 
Our response will centre on the crudely dichotomous way in which the
question of causality is conventionally put. The real problem lies not in sym-
metry; couching the issue of agency as a mutually exclusive choice between
one form of agency or another is what produces the aporia. The question,
posed prominently in Rose et al.’s abstract, seems so innocuous and reasona-
ble: “Does technology cause effects in organizations or is it humans that deter-
mine how technology is used?” The point of symmetry is not to answer the
question, but in fact to reject it; more specifically, to reject the simple ontolog-
ical polarisation (human vs. technology) that it insidiously implies, a dichot-
omy that paradoxically makes it impossible to resolve the issue that the
question ostensibly seeks to clarify.
First, let us attempt to characterise Latour’s basic position on humans,
technology and what Rose et al. call ‘the problem of agency.’ We draw on
Pandora’s Hope (Latour 1999) as our primary source, where his general posi-
tion is extensively articulated, in the context of a general philippic against
dualism and essentialism. These are seen as the cornerstones of the modernist
epistemological settlement, and all the evil that has flowed from it. We cannot,
of course, do proper justice in attempting to distil the essence of a highly elab-
orate and complex argument into a few paragraphs. The book is ambitious in
scope, nuanced in argumentation, sometimes obscure, always stimulating;
moreover, its primary concerns are with science and scientific knowledge,
rather than technology, although much is said regarding the latter. The decoc-
tion here has been extracted to serve present purposes; so much has inevitably176 • T. McMaster & D. Wastell
been left out, of a strange and exotic world of fetishes, fact-ishes, vascularisa-
tion, brains-in-vats, clinamen, and so on. In this brief riposte, we have only
limited aims, hoping to clarify some broad points, to whet the reader’s appe-
tite, and to raise some brief questions of our own.
As we have said, Latour’s project is an audacious one, nothing less than
unravelling the modernist epistemological settlement, in a voyage that takes in
such diverse locations as the Amazonian rainforest, Pasteur’s laboratory, and
Plato’s Athens. In this settlement, traced back as far as Socrates, the world has
been iconoclastically shattered into two ontological categories: human sub-
jects (sentient, moral, purposive, of intrinsic worth) and inanimate objects
(morally void, intrinsically worthless, of derivative value only when serving
the ends of human actors). What errors and conundrums does the dualist
world-view lead us into, especially regarding the agency of technology?
Latour uses the gun as his technological exemplar. Here the question of
agency is simply and topically posed; “Do guns kill people or do people kill
people?” Transposing into the present context, we might equally ask: “Do
ERPs standardise procedures, or do managers do it?”
There is no ready answer, at least not in terms of the dualist settlement that
insists on a rigid subjective/objective distinction. The question cannot be
reduced to unilateral agency on either side. Without managers, the ERP can
have no impact on procedures; equally, without the ERP the managers’
attempts to standardise would take a different course, perhaps never even be
attempted. Whatever, they would be different in terms of means and outcome,
forced to take a different detour. Of course, the answer to the question “who is
responsible?” is that both actants are implicated. But there are two radically
different ways in which we may formulate their joint operation. In the dualist
worldview, the relationship of the human to the non-human is purely an instru-
mental one; agency is the exclusive prerogative of humans, and technology is
merely an instrument. This is the world most clearly depicted in Rose et al.’s
second vignette (ERP at Martin): The managers (subject) used the ERP
(object) to standardise procedures (goal). Latour rejects the asymmetry that is
subtly but profoundly embedded in this formulation. He argues that the mod-
ern world is so pervasively fabricated, tools and technology so ubiquitous, that
we simply cannot meaningfully separate humans and non-humans. The symbi-
osis is mutually critical; literally neither can exist without the other. “The
place where a person and a tool exist independently is a distinction for con-
venience’s sake, not a functional one. Where does the person hammering in a
nail exist independently from the hammer?” (Dreyfus 2004). We might add
that the same is true for the hammer (and the nail for that matter); this is the
nub of the principle of symmetry. T. McMaster & D. Wastell • 177
This brings us to the second thrust of Latour’s critique, his rejection of
essentialism. For Latour, existence is a matter of action. There is no room for
essences in his system, i.e., a priori ahistorical properties that capture the
intrinsic nature of a phenomenon or entity (be it human or non-human). All
actants have a history, and it is only through their action in the world that they
have an identity. There is no essence of ERP any more than the microbes
revealed by Pasteur have a definitive, timeless nature; all actants are changed
as they combine and associate with other elements of an evolving and ever-
more ramifying network of actants. The idea of an ERP without agency (i.e.
one that does not act) is an ERP that, by definition, does not exist. By their
deeds ye shall know them, would seem to summarise Latour’s pragmatic
credo. An ERP is what an ERP does. 
What then does Latour offer in place of the modernist settlement? The pri-
mary principle is that of symmetry, emblematised in his coining of the term
‘actant,’ applying equally to humans and non-humans alike. Both humans and
non-humans act, they do things; they have equal claim to play the role of
grammatical subjects in sentences. We see this in the third vignette in the fol-
lowing statement which explicitly attributes agency to technology: “The ERP
came largely to structure the new work practices.” There is really nothing
more radical in the principle of symmetry than that, that technology as the sub-
ject in a sentence is not a mere trope, but is to be taken literally. The sentence
is still problematic though: asymmetry remains but in the opposite direction,
erasing now the human actants. What restructures work practices is neither the
managers nor the ERP acting alone. Both working indissolubly together has
the effect, a ‘hybrid actor’ (in Latour’s terminology) compounded of both
managers and ERP technology1.
Returning to our original example, the principle of symmetry leads to the
following reformulation: “The managers plus the ERP (hybrid actor) restruc-
ture the work practices (goal).” This is no semiotic trickery or parlour game; it
is deadly serious. Nothing else will do for Latour. For him, humans and non-
humans are inextricably enmeshed in ever more complex networks of associa-
tions, which Latour denotes sociotechnical collectives. Only collectives can
act. Our lives are so bound up with artefacts, that merely to put on our clothes
produces a complex collective, a hybrid actor. The repertoire of the naked man
is perforce a limited one compared to the collective that includes his clothes,
his mobile phone, his car, as well as the man himself. Maintaining the subject-
object dichotomy prevents our full understanding of such collectives, even to
recognise their existence and the fundamental part they play: “It is neither
people nor guns that kill. Responsibility for action must be shared amongst the
various actants” (p. 180). Latour’s argument is to redistribute competences, to178 • T. McMaster & D. Wastell
move away from the zero-sum antagonism of the person/thing dualism in
which “any extension of the competences of one is gained at the expense of
the other” (Pottage 2001). Competence and responsibility are the properties of
sociotechnical composites.
The question posed in challenge 3, to say how computer actants act and the
consequences thereof, should by now seem a bizarre one. In short, we have
seen that technology cannot act without people, any more than people can act
without technology. Agency cannot be reduced to either pure humans or pure
machines. The reason is exquisitely simple, that such transcendental forms do
not exist in the sublunary world. It is hybrid actants composed of humans and
non-humans that act; and the act and the actants cannot be separated. Moreo-
ver, the computer itself is not some sort of an irreducible atomic entity. It is a
composite itself, a ‘black box’ that can be recursively opened up to reveal ever
more complex associations of human and non-human components, forming
networks stretching back through history, ramifying bewildering through time
and space. All these embedded actants (designers, chips, circuit boards, pro-
grammers) played a part inits fabrication and are complicit its behaviour. The
attempt to impose or attribute a stand-alone concept of agency upon actants is
thus a notion quite alien to ANT, one that its adherents would have difficulty
recognizing, a false consciousness they avowedly set aside when they adopted
the principle of symmetry. Inscribed in challenge 3 is the implicit separation,
the very duality that ANT exhorts us to eschew. But the subject/object dichot-
omy is so ingrained in our habits of thought, that it is hard to slough off. As
well as the abstract and the challenge, it infiltrates much of Rose et al.’s paper.
We would highlight the assertions that ANT “seeks to position itself firmly in
the middle of the spectrum between technological and social determinism”2,
and again, “in ANT, technology becomes an independent actor in its own
right.” These exhibits show how hard it is to resist the compulsion to separate
the social and the technical, a cognitive pathology that we might characterise
as ‘symmetrophobia.’ 
Symmetry of human and non-human actants is fundamental to Latour’s cri-
tique and to his prospectus, a sine qua non. Why then does it seem so trouble-
some? Only so, when symmetry is mistaken for equivalence! Manifestly,
ontological differentiation is intended, else why retain the distinction between
human and non-human actants? There is no crude argument in Latour that
humans and machines are the same, no talk to be found anywhere of Turing
tests, no contention that machines per se have human intelligence, spiritual
aspirations or are actuated by moral impulses. Latour merely asks that we see
the world not in terms of an unbridgeable schism between two incommensu-
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technical collectives, as having equal status in terms of their capacity to enter
into new associations, to ‘articulate’ with one another (swapping properties,
combining elements) in the formation of ‘propositions,’ Latour’s term for new
hybrids before they become fully-fledged, institutionalised members of the
collective. 
Here we move into the larger debate, which is the true aim of Latour’s
intellectual labour. His project is a grand moral one, going well beyond a nar-
row consideration of the nature of agency and the power of machines (be they
ERP systems or vacuum cleaners) to act autonomously. The final chapter of
Pandora’s Hope sketches out, in abstracto, the profundity of the change that is
implied. By insisting, via the principle of symmetry, that non-humans and
humans inhabit the same collective, they become subject to a common politi-
cal agenda and field of action. In terms more familiar to IS, we can thus see
the principle of symmetry as a principle for design, more specifically for the
design of sociotechnical collectives. The scope for design is enlarged beyond
that of fashioning mere technical artefacts. Homo faber fabricatus is
dethroned, and the throne claimed rightfully by Homo faber socialis3. A moral
aim takes shape, nothing less than to “live the good life together” (p. 297) in a
‘well-articulated’ collective, i.e., one where its members, human and non-
human, are fully mixed together, talked about, their mutual entanglements and
co-evolution visible for debate and scrutiny. A two-house collective (i.e.,
based on the dualist settlement) made up of free human subjects and mute
technological objects, on the other hand is ‘inarticulate,’ no speech is possible
on the relationships between the two houses, no debate around propositions
for the betterment of all. This is the real point of the principle of symmetry.
Although Latour’s concern is much broader (political ecology and the survival
of the planet) than our usual application domain (i.e., the organisation) it is
clear what he means in our more parochial demesne. No more and no less than
the need for open, democratic debate in which new ‘propositions’ (novel com-
binations of technology and people) are considered with the fullest participa-
tion of all members, aiming at the greatest collective benefit, not just the
advantage of a small (mainly human) elite of owners and senior managers. 
Considering briefly the three vignettes, the issues are easily dealt with. The
contrast between the three reduces to no more than matters of thematisation
and ellipsis, presenting no challenge to the principle of symmetry. They are
narratives in which the action has merely been thematized to give prominence
to certain classes of actant and to elide others; as accounts, they are all thus
impoverished, revealing more about the motives and interests of the authors
(of the accounts) than the events described. The third comes closest to an ANT
reading, though is skewed as we have noted. A degree of symmetry is none-180 • T. McMaster & D. Wastell
theless attained, and the complexity and indeterminacy of causality in com-
plex collectives is acknowledged. The non-human actants are effaced
completely in the first vignette, airbrushed away. Yet they were there, and we
are bound to ask what part did the ERP in particular play? In the second, let us
be told more of how the ERP ‘marshalled’ the CEO instead of another lop-
sided, aggrandising account of the mastery of homo faber. 
As a parting shot, let us ask a question or two of our own. Where do the
authors stand in these deep and perplexing matters, regarding the central ques-
tion of agency in particular? We suspect that they are dualists, as our remarks
above imply. Duellists certainly in their issue of challenges! Symmetrophobes,
defend yourselves! For our part, we would like to ask what exactly is meant by
the “dual dance,” an elegant but obscure metaphor when we try to delve into
its meaning? A dance around what, and to what end? A balletic spectacle or a
drunken bop, an improvisation or a highly choreographed piece, in which case
who writes the choreography? Is agency somehow a product of the dance
(some mysterious efflux of interaction) or perhaps even the dance itself?
Should we think of technology and humans as two isolated dancers, with sep-
arate essences and asymmetrical roles revolving endlessly around each other?
Does not the metaphor imply such a separation? There is much in their piece
that directly suggests the modernist settlement, and that homo faber is alive
and well. Anyway, it is not our place to put words in mouths, we seek merely
to issue a counter-challenge and to call for further explication of this meta-
phor, at once both catchy and slippery, if that is not a contradiction. 
We are now at the end of this short riposte. We have had greatly enjoyed its
writing and have attempted to entertain and to provoke alike, in the spirit of
stimulating debate. Conscious of the somewhat scatological character of the
opening, it is fitting to end on a loftier note, leaving the final (tangentially rele-
vant) words to W. B. Yeats (from the poem, Among Schoolchildren):
O chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?
Notes
1. We would teasingly ask whether the subtle insertion of the adverb “largely” is
an unconscious concession that the action is a joint one of a hybrid actor. We
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2. Because ANT sees no separation of technology and society, there is no
spectrum between them into which ANT would wish to position itself. ANT is
not some sort of ‘third way’ compromise, an attempt to patch up the
modernist settlement. It rejects that settlement outright, attempting to
substitute a new, more democratic order that gives equal weight and status to
all members, human and non-human, of the collective. 
3. Respectively, Man, the tool-maker and Man, the creator of society;
terminology taken from (Latour 1994).
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